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Chapter thirteen
Towards a Right to Engage in 
the Fair Transformative Use of 
Copyright‑Protected Expression
Graham Reynolds*
A. INTRODUCTION 
Networked digital technologies have given Canadians the opportunity to 
engage with culture in a way that has never before been possible. Empow-
ered and inspired, individuals from Prince George to the Georgian Bay 
to George Street are rejecting their former role as passive consumers of 
culture in order to participate in a continuing process of cultural (re)cre-
ation, production, and dialogue.1 One way in which they are doing so is 
by engaging in the transformative use of existing expression, a type of 
creative activity in which previously existing expression is reworked for a 
new purpose, with new interpretations or with a new meaning.2 
* The author would like to thank the Foundation for Legal Research for their financial 
assistance in the preparation of this chapter.
1 See Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture (New York: NYU Press, 2006); Henry Jen-
kins, Fans, Bloggers, and Gamers (New York: NYU Press, 2006). 
2 See Andrew Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (London: HM Treasury, 
2006) at 66, where it is noted that the purpose of the transformative works exception 
is to “enable creators to rework material for a new purpose of with a new meaning.” 
Many commentators take the position that the starting point for the introduction 
of the term “transformative use” is Judge Pierre’s Leval’s article, “Toward a Fair Use 
Standard” (1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 at 1111. Judge Leval defines the term “trans-
formative use” as follows: “The use must be productive and must employ the quoted 
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original. A quotation 
of copyrighted material that merely repackages or republishes the original is unlikely 
to pass the test; in Justice Story’s words, it would merely “supersede the objects” of the 
Graham Reynolds396
This type of creative activity did not originate with networked digital 
technologies. Individuals have been engaging in the transformative use of 
existing expression for millennia. J. Harold Ellens has suggested that the 
Book of Genesis is a rewrite of an “ancient Mesopotamian fertility story of 
sex and seduction.”3 Chaucer rewrote Ovid.4 Pope rewrote Chaucer.5 Alexan-
der Lindey states that Shakespeare “commandeered everything that suited 
his purpose—Greek biography, Roman history, the tales of the Middle Ages, 
long familiar anecdotes, old farces, the plays of his predecessors—and cast 
them into forms popular in his day.”6 Contemporary Canadian artists Gor-
don Duggan, Brian Jungen, and Diana Thorneycroft, working in the genre 
of appropriation art, transform existing expression into new works. 
Transformative creativity, however, although it did not originate with 
networked digital technologies, has been “democratized” through their 
use.7 Anyone with access to a computer, easily obtainable software, and 
the internet can now create, distribute, and enjoy transformative works 
such as mashups (songs made up of the combination of two or more 
pre-existing sound recordings),8 machinima (films made within video 
original. If, on the other hand, the secondary use adds value to the original — if the 
quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new informa-
tion, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings — this is the very type of 
activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society. 
Transformative uses may include criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character 
of the original author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in the original in 
order to defend or rebut it. They also may include parody, symbolism, aesthetic declar-
ations, and innumerable other uses.” In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 
579 (1994), the Supreme Court of the United States stated that a use is transformative 
if it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the 
first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message.”
3 J. Harold Ellens, Sex in the Bible (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2006) at 55.
4 Michael A. Calabrese, Chaucer’s Ovidian Arts of Love (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1994) at 23. 
5 Hayden Carruth, foreword in Stephen Berg, With Akhmatova at the black gates 
(Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2002) at ix.
6 Alexander Lindey, Plagiarism and Originality (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1952) at 74.
7 See Yochai Benkler, “From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of 
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access” (1999-2000) 52 Fed. 
Comm. L.J. 561 at 562: “Technology now makes possible the attainment of decen-
tralization and democratization by enabling small groups of constituents and 
individuals to become users — participants in the production of their information 
environment — rather than by lightly regulating concentrated commercial mass 
media to make them better serve individuals conceived as passive consumers.”
8 See Graham Reynolds, “A Stroke of Genius or Copyright Infringement? Mashups 
and Copyright in Canada”, (2009) 6:3 SCRIPTed 534. 
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games),9 digital collage (artistic works made up of the combination of pieces 
of two or more works), remixes (works which take existing expression and 
combine it with other expression), and fan fiction (literary works which in-
corporate a character, setting, or plot from a pre-existing work).10 
Acts relating to the transformative use of existing expression provide 
significant benefits to Canadian society. Perhaps most notably, they pro-
mote the values underlying the constitutionally protected right to free-
dom of expression.11 Under the current Copyright Act, however, many 
such acts would likely be found to prima facie infringe copyright.12 The 
application of fair dealing, a user’s right contained within the Copyright 
Act which gives individuals the right to use a substantial amount of copy-
right-protected expression for certain purposes provided the use is done 
“fairly,” will result in various acts relating to the transformative use of 
copyright-protected expression being deemed non-infringing. However, 
many acts will not be protected by fair dealing as it is currently written 
and interpreted. 
This chapter argues that the Copyright Act needs to be revised to address 
the conflict between the rights of copyright owners and the public inter-
est with respect to transformative works.13 Certain amendments proposed 
 9 See Graham Reynolds, “All the Game’s A Stage: Machinima and Copyright in Can-
ada”, (2010) J.W.I.P. (forthcoming).
10 See Graham Reynolds, “The Impact of Canadian Copyright Laws on the Voices of 
Marginalised Groups: Towards a Right to Rewrite”, (2010) Alb. L.R. (forthcoming); 
Grace Westcott, “Friction Over Fan Fiction” (2008) Literary Review of Canada, 
http://reviewcanada.ca/essays/2008/07/01/friction-over-fan-fiction/; Rebecca Tush-
net, “Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law” (1997) 17 Loy. 
L.A. Ent. L.J. 651. 
11 See RJR Macdonald, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (RJR Mac-
donald). The issue of the intersection of copyright and freedom of expression merits 
discussion. This discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this paper to address. 
See David Fewer, “Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the 
Limits of Copyright in Canada” (1997) 55 University of Toronto L.R. 175; Graham 
Reynolds, “A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Impact of the Legislative Protection 
of Technological Protection Measures on Fair Dealing and Freedom of Expression” 
(2006) Volume 5, No. 3 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology. 
12 The Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 [Copyright Act] gives copyright owners various 
rights with respect to works. One such right is the right to reproduce either the 
entire work or a substantial part of the work. Individuals who reproduce a substan-
tial portion of a copyright-protected work without the permission of the copyright 
owner prima facie infringe copyright, regardless of whether the work has been 
altered, transformed, or used in a different context than the original work.
13 Another issue which merits attention is whether the Copyright Act needs to be 
revised to address the conflict between moral rights and the public interest with 
Graham Reynolds398
in Bill C-32, Canada’s most recent attempt at copyright reform — namely, 
the expansion of the fair dealing defence to include categories of parody, 
satire, and education; and the introduction of a right to create non com-
mercial user-generated content - will result in more acts relating to the 
transformative use of copyright-protected expression being deemed non-
infringing.14 These positive developments, however, are undermined by 
restrictive anti-circumvention provisions, also contained within Bill C-32, 
which make it an offence to circumvent an access control technological 
protection measure (TPM) for any purpose save those expressly exempted. 
Fair dealing is not included in the list of exemptions. If Bill C-32 is passed 
in its current form it will be an offence to circumvent an access control 
TPM in order to engage in the transformative use of expression.
This chapter takes the position that acts relating to the transforma-
tive use of copyright-protected expression benefit Canadian society and 
should not be seen as offences under the Copyright Act. To this end, it offers 
two recommendations for copyright reform. First, the fair dealing defence 
should be amended to incorporate a right to engage in transformative 
use of copyright-protected expression. Such an amendment would give 
individuals the right to use a substantial amount of copyright-protected 
expression for the purpose of engaging in transformative use, provided 
certain attribution requirements are satisfied and that the copyright-pro-
tected work is dealt with fairly. Second, the provisions of Bill C-32 which 
relate to the legal protection of TPMs should be modified to state that 
respect to transformative works. While copyright protects the author’s commercial 
interests, moral rights protect the author’s non-commercial interests. In Canada, 
various moral rights are protected under the Copyright Act, namely the right to the 
integrity of the work and the right to attribution. The latter right encompasses 
“the right, where reasonable in the circumstances, to be associated with a work as 
its author by name or under a pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous” (s. 
14.1(1), Copyright Act)).The right to integrity of the work is infringed if the work is, 
“to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author, (a) distorted, mutilated 
or otherwise modified; or (b) used in association with a product, service, cause or 
institution” (s. 28.2(1), Copyright Act). If, in the process of engaging in the trans-
formative use of copyright-protected expression, an individual modifies, mutilates 
or distorts a work, the right to integrity, held by the author of the original work, 
may be infringed. As well, if the transformative work fails to reference the author 
of the original work, the author’s right to attribution may also be infringed. Further 
research and analysis must be done to determine whether modifications should 
be made to Canada’s moral rights laws in order to ensure that they do not chill the 
creation and dissemination of transformative works. This topic is beyond the scope 
of this paper to address.
14 Bill C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3d Sess., 40th Parl., 2010. 
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individuals are not committing an offence by circumventing a TPM in or-
der to do something which is otherwise permitted by law. The adoption 
of such an approach would be consistent with the two 1996 World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO) internet treaties which Canada 
has signed but not yet ratified.15 As well, it would give copyright holders 
an additional tool to combat copyright infringement while ensuring that 
individuals are not deterred from engaging in the transformative use of 
copyright-protected expression through the imposition of an additional 
legal barrier.
B. DO ACTS RELATING TO THE TRANSFORMATIVE USE 
OF COPYRIGHT-PROTECTED EXPRESSION BENEFIT 
CANADIANS?
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), in RJR Macdonald, Inc. v. Canada (At-
torney General), stated that the values underlying the constitutionally 
protected right to freedom of expression include “the search for political, 
artistic and scientific truth, the protection of individual autonomy and 
self-development, and the promotion of public participation in the demo-
cratic process.”16 Acts relating to the transformative use of copyright-pro-
tected expression promote these values. 
Transformative works can assist individuals in the search for political 
and artistic truth. Some transformative works critique individual polit-
icians, policy positions, and political parties. A search for “Stephen Harper 
remix,” “Jack Layton remix,” or “Michael Ignatieff remix” on YouTube, for 
instance, returns various examples of critical transformative works. In 
the American context, Richard L. Edwards and Chuck Tryon, in an article 
entitled “Political video mashups as allegories of citizen empowerment,” 
note that:
high-profile mashups during the 2008 elections included hip-hop star 
will.i.am’s “Yes We Can” video (a remix of Obama’s New Hampshire 
primary concession speech in February 2008), the eponymous Obama 
Girl’s “Crush on Obama” video, satirist Paul Shanklin’s “Barack the 
Magic Negro” song (a remix of an Los Angeles Times column and the 
15 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (adopted 20 December 1996, 
entered into force 6 March 2002) 36 ILM 65 [WCT], World Intellectual Property Organ-
ization Performances and Phonograms Treaty (adopted 20 December 1996, entered into 
force 20 May 2002) 36 ILM 76 [WPPT]. 
16 RJR Macdonald, above note 11 at para. 72.
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song “Puff the Magic Dragon”) and Comedy Central’s late night host 
Stephen Colbert’s “John McCain’s Green Screen Challenge” (a mashup 
contest centering around a speech given by Republican presidential 
candidate John McCain). Each of these mashups in turn encouraged 
or stimulated other users to create their own video mashups, such 
as the numerous user-generated videos on BarelyPolitical.com that 
remix video footage of Obama Girl, or users who submitted their own 
mashup creations into Colbert’s remix challenge.17
Edwards and Tryon state that “[j]ust as in the case of a video camera in 
the hands of a video activist at a street rally, engaged online users can 
produce mashups as a means for political advocacy (tool), political protest 
(weapon), and political observation (witness).”18 
Transformative works can also assist in the search for artistic truth. 
Transformative works that are critical of certain genres of art, artists, in-
dividual works, or art movements may help individuals re-examine their 
own views on art and culture. Some mashups may be created for the pur-
pose of critiquing a specific artist. An individual may wish, for instance, to 
draw attention to and subvert the macho image of a certain band by creat-
ing a mashup which combines their aggressive vocals with a light, playful 
musical accompaniment. Other individuals use transformative works to 
critique certain genres of art. Peggy Ahwesh’s machinima, She Puppet, for 
instance, created within the video game Tomb Raider, provides a feminist 
critique of both Tomb Raider and the “male dominated world of gaming.”19 
Non-critical transformative works may also aid in the search for artistic 
truth. By emphasizing an artist’s admirable characteristics, for instance, 
a transformative work may inspire individuals to look more deeply at that 
artist’s body of work. Examples abound of individuals creating and dis-
tributing transformative works which act as homages or tributes to cer-
tain artists, art forms, or genres.20
Transformative works help protect individual autonomy and self-de-
velopment. In creating transformative works, individuals take existing 
expression and rework it, altering its meaning and purpose. The act of re-
17 L. Edwards and Chuck Tryon, “Political video mashups as allegories of citizen em-
powerment” (2009) 14 First Monday 10, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/
ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2617/2305#p4
18 Edwards and Tryon, above note 17.
19 Peggy Ahwesh, (2001) She Puppet; Elijah Horwatt, “New Media Resistance: Machin-
ima and the Avant-Garde” (2008) 73/74 Cineaction 8 at 11.
20 See, for example, www.youtube.com/watch?v=eco8IdnHjEQ for a Shania Twain 
tribute; www.youtube.com/watch?v=7L1HYCV9ScA for a Nickelback tribute.
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working existing expression is an empowering experience. Rather than 
acting as a passive consumer of expression, individuals, through the cre-
ation of transformative works, actively engage with it. Through machin-
ima, they can use a video game’s characters to tell a story which they 
want to tell, rather than experiencing the game exclusively in the manner 
outlined by its creators. Through mashups, individuals can imagine what 
might occur should their two favourite bands play together on the same 
stage. Through fan fiction, individuals can write themselves, their friends, 
their family, and their life into works which they find personally signifi-
cant or which are culturally significant.21 In reworking and remaking a 
text, individuals can assert themselves against it and express their agree-
ment with it. They can mold it to their own experiences and worldview. 
They are developing alongside (and within) the texts. 
Transformative use of copyright-protected expression does not just 
benefit individuals. It also allows marginalised or oppressed groups to 
achieve autonomy from more empowered cultures by writing themselves 
into central roles in culturally significant texts. 22 One noteworthy ex-
ample of a work in which this occurs is the Wind Done Gone, Alice Randall’s 
rewrite of the Margaret Mitchell work Gone with the Wind.23 As Neil Neta-
nel states, Randall’s rewrite “upend[s] Mitchell’s idealized portrait [of the 
“antebellum South during and after the Civil War”24] by deploying its very 
story lines, scenes, and characters to reimagine them from the viewpoint 
of a slave.”25
Transformative works may also promote public participation in the 
democratic process. One facet of the democratic process is political par-
ticipation. Certain transformative works may inspire individuals to be-
come involved in the political process as a candidate, a volunteer for a pol-
itical campaign, or as a more informed (or first time) voter. Democracy, 
however, can be seen as something broader than political participation. 
Jack Balkin states that:
A democratic culture is more than representative institutions of dem-
ocracy, and it is more than deliberation about public issues. Rather, a 
21 See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, “Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural 
Theory of ‘Mary Sue’ Fan Fiction as Fair Use” (2007) 95 Calif. L. Rev. 597.
22 Jeannie Suk, “Originality” (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1988 at 1992–93.
23 Alice Randall, The Wind Done Gone (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001); 
Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind (New York: Macmillan, 1975).
24 Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
25 Neil Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 159.
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democratic culture is a culture in which individuals have a fair oppor-
tunity to participate in the forms of meaning making that constitute 
them as individuals. Democratic culture is about individual liberty as 
well as collective self-governance; it is about each individual’s ability 
to participate in the production and distribution of culture.26 
By giving individuals the ability to participate in culture “through build-
ing on what they find in culture and innovating with it, modifying it, and 
turning it to their purposes,” in a way that was not previously possible 
on such a scale, transformative use of existing expression, facilitated 
by digital networked technologies, promotes public participation in the 
democratic process.27 
This part of the chapter has argued that acts relating to transformative 
use of copyright-protected expression are beneficial for Canadian society. 
Specifically, it has suggested that these acts further the values underlying 
freedom of expression, as articulated by the SCC. These acts, however, may 
also infringe copyright. 
C. DO ACTS RELATING TO THE TRANSFORMATIVE USE 
OF COPYRIGHT-PROTECTED EXPRESSION INFRINGE 
COPYRIGHT?
Anyone can rework or remake expression which is no longer (or has never 
been) protected by copyright. However, although some individuals who en-
gage in transformative use rework expression which is no longer protected 
by copyright,28 many individuals remake works that are still protected by 
copyright.29 In so doing, they may be infringing the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner with respect to the works in question. These rights, set out 
26 Balkin, Jack M. ‘Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society’ (2004) 79 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 1 at 3–4. 
27 Balkin, above note 26 at 5. 
28 Canadians Anthony Del Col and Conor McCreery recently created the “fantasy-ad-
venture” comic-book series Kill Shakespeare, which has been described as the Globe 
and Mail as “a mash-up of heroes and villains from a dozen plays flung together in a 
new, supernatural adventure.” (John Barber, “THWACK! Two Canadians want to kill 
Shakespeare” The Globe and Mail (17 April, 2010), www.theglobeandmail.com/books/
thwack-two-canadians-want-to-kill-shakespeare/article1536890/.
29 This is potentially due to two reasons. First, the period of copyright in works 
extends for approximately the life of the author plus fifty years. Thus, many of the 
works which are currently available for transformative re-use are protected by copy-
right. Second, many individuals may wish to engage with recently created content 
that is currently culturally relevant. 
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in section 3 of the Copyright Act, include the right to, with respect to either 
an entire work or a substantial part of a work, reproduce it, communicate it 
to the public by telecommunication, and perform it in public.30 
Thus, if a transformative work reproduces a substantial amount of copy-
right-protected expression without the permission of the copyright owner, 
the creator of the transformative work will have prima facie infringed the 
copyright owner’s right to reproduce the work. The distribution of such 
a work over the internet will prima facie infringe the copyright owner’s 
right to communicate the work to the public by telecommunication. And 
the act of downloading such a work will, again, prima facie infringe the 
copyright owner’s right to reproduce the work. 
The question of whether a substantial amount of expression has been 
taken from the copyright-protected work “must be assessed from both 
a quantitative and qualitative perspective.”31 Even a small taking can be 
deemed substantial if analysed from a qualitative perspective. As well, the 
question of whether a taking is substantial depends on the type of work 
involved. With respect to musical works, for instance, it appears that the 
amount taken will be considered to be a substantial part of the copyright-
protected work if it renders the copyright-protected work recognizable or 
identifiable within the allegedly infringing work.32 In Hager v. ECW Press 
Ltd. a case which addressed substantial taking in the context of a literary 
work, Reed J. found that the defendants had committed copyright infringe-
ment by reproducing one-third of a nine page chapter on Shania Twain in a 
longer work on the Canadian country music icon.33 As noted by Reed J.: 
the conclusion I draw from the facts is that in terms of quantity, a 
substantial amount of her work was taken. In addition, the parts of 
her book that are most valuable to her were taken: the direct quotes 
from Shania Twain. I conclude that qualitatively a very valuable and 
significant part of her work was taken.34 
It is likely that many transformative works could be seen as having repro-
duced a substantial amount of copyright-protected expression. Many ma-
chinima, for instance, feature characters, background scenery, and objects 
30 Copyright Act, above note 12 at s. 3 
31 Hager v. ECW Press Ltd., [1999] 2 F.C. 287 at para. 15 [Hager]. 
32 See Canadian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Canadian National Exhibition Associa-
tion, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 154 (Ont. H.C.J.) [CPRS]; Grignon v Roussel (1991), 44 F.T.R. 121 
(F.C.T.D.) [Grignon].
33 Hager, above note 31. 
34 Ibid. at para.16. 
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from the underlying video game. In writing fan fiction, authors frequently 
retain elements of the plot, characters, or setting from the original stor-
ies. In creating mashups, mashup artists often attempt to ensure that the 
underlying songs are recognisable. As Gregg Gillis (Girl Talk) has noted, 
“I like to use [samples] in a way that everything is recognizable. That’s a 
part of the fun where you recognize the sample and you hear how it can be 
manipulated.”35 In reproducing a “substantial” amount of copyright-pro-
tected expression, these works prima facie infringe the exclusive rights of 
the copyright owner. 
Various defences to copyright infringement, described by the SCC as 
users’ rights, are contained within the Copyright Act.36 The user right which 
may prove most useful with respect to acts relating to the transformative 
use of copyright-protected expression is fair dealing. The fair dealing de-
fence is set out in sections 29–29.2 of the Copyright Act and reads as follows:
29. Fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study does not 
infringe copyright.
29.1 Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not in-
fringe copyright if the following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a work,
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s performance,
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.
29.2 Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not infringe 
copyright if the following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a work,
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s performance,
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.37
35 Douglas Wolk, “Barely Legal” The Village Voice (5 February 2002), www.villagevoice.
com/2002-02-05/music/barely-legal. 
36 CCH Canadian et al. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 at para. 58 [CCH]. 
37 Copyright Act, above note 12 at ss. 29–29.2.
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The fair dealing analysis proceeds in three steps. First, in order for an 
act to be covered by fair dealing, it must have been done for one of the 
listed fair dealing purposes (namely research, private study, criticism, re-
view, and news reporting). Second, if the act is done for the purpose of 
criticism, review, or news reporting, certain criteria with respect to attri-
bution must be satisfied. Third, the copyright-protected work must have 
been dealt with fairly. 
It is likely that a large number of the acts relating to transformative 
works were done for the purpose of one of the listed fair dealing categories. 
The SCC, in CCH Canadian et al. v. Law Society of Upper Canada has indicated 
that these categories “must be given a large and liberal interpretation in 
order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”38 The cat-
egory of research has been interpreted broadly. The SCC further noted that 
research, for the purposes of fair dealing, need not be private and can be 
for profit.39 Both “for-profit” research conducted by law firms and thirty-
second previews of musical works have been found to fall within the cat-
egory of research.40 Transformative works created or used for the purpose 
of research, such as those created or acquired by researchers studying the 
history or sociology of user-generated content, for instance, would likely 
fall within this category. 
Transformative works created or used in private may be seen as hav-
ing been created for the purpose of private study. However, many trans-
formative works, although they may be created in private, are then shared 
with the world through peer to peer file sharing programs or websites. 
Reed J., in the leading case to address the scope of the “private study” 
category, Hager v. ECW Press Ltd., has stated that “the use contemplated by 
private study . . . is not one in which the copied work is communicated to 
the public.”41 Thus, the act of making transformative works public would 
likely remove these dealings from the ambit of the fair dealing category of 
private study. 
Some transformative works may have been created or used for the pur-
pose of news reporting. News reports discussing the topic of user-gener-
ated creativity, for instance, may feature clips or photos from mashups or 
machinima. Some transformative works, as well, may be seen as having 
been created for the purpose of review. The leading Canadian case to inter-
38 CCH above note 36.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2010 
FCA 123.
41 Hager, above note 31. 
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pret the category of review, Canada v. James Lorimer & Co. (Lorimer), states 
that fair dealing for the purpose of review “requires as a minimum some 
dealing with the work other than simply condensing it into an abridged 
version and reproducing it under the author’s name.”42 As transformative 
works rework existing expression for a new purpose or new meaning, it is 
likely that they would be seen as surpassing the minimum standard sug-
gested for the category of review in Lorimer. 
Many transformative works are critical. Whether the fair dealing cat-
egory of criticism encompasses these types of criticism, however, is an 
open question. The exact bounds of the fair dealing category of criticism 
are yet to be determined. A prominent Canadian case interpreting the 
fair dealing category of criticism, Cie Générale des Établissements Michel-
in-Michelin & Cie v. C.A.W.-Canada et al. (Michelin),43 interpreted criticism 
narrowly. Specifically, it indicated that the fair dealing category of criti-
cism does not encompass parody. Michelin, however, was decided seven 
years before the SCC, in CCH indicated that courts were to interpret the 
fair dealing categories broadly. It remains to be seen how broadly criticism 
will be interpreted post-CCH 
As indicated above, a large number of acts relating to transformative 
works will likely be seen as having been done for the purpose of one of 
the listed fair dealing categories. However, many acts relating to trans-
formative works will likely not be seen as having been done for these pur-
poses. For instance, many acts relating to transformative works which 
are made public and which are not critical will likely not fall within any 
of the existing categories.44 These types of dealings include transforma-
tive works which are created or distributed as homages, expressions of 
appreciation, and tributes. One example of such a work is Danger Mouse’s 
Grey Album, a mashup of Jay-Z’s Black Album and the Beatles’ White Al-
bum which has been described as a “sincere, sophisticated homage to two 
acclaimed works and the musical celebrities who created them.”45 Other 
types of transformative works which will not be protected by the fair deal-
ing defence as it is currently written and interpreted are transformative 
works which use copyright-protected expression as the building blocks, 
42 Canada v James Lorimer and Co. (1984), 77 C.P.R. (2d) 262.
43 Cie Générale des Établissements Michelin-Michelin and Cie v. C.A.W.-Canada et al (1996), 
71 C.P.R. (3d) 348. 
44 This conclusion suggests that fair dealing, as it is currently constructed, favours 
critics over fans. 
45 Johanna Blakley, “The Grey Album, Celebrity Homage and Transformative Appro-
priation” (2005)  www.learcenter.org/images/event_uploads/DemersNotes.pdf.
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or raw material, for new expression, without commenting on or critiquing 
the expression itself. Acts relating to these types of works will likely not 
be seen as having been done for any of the listed fair dealing purposes. As 
they are not protected by fair dealing, these acts can be enjoined by the 
copyright owner and the individuals who engage in these acts can be ex-
posed to significant financial penalties.46 As a large number of transform-
ative works will satisfy the first step in the fair dealing analysis, however, 
this chapter will proceed by discussing the second and third steps.47 
The second step in the fair dealing analysis only applies to acts done for 
the purpose of criticism, review and news reporting. Acts done for these 
purposes, provided they are deemed fair, will not infringe copyright if cer-
tain attribution requirements are satisfied. With respect to a work, for 
instance, both the source of the work and the author (if given) must be 
mentioned. This requirement will not provide a significant impediment to 
individuals who wish to create, distribute, or enjoy transformative works. 
Attribution can be given, for instance, in the end credits of a machinima, 
in a file name in a mashup, or in the title page of fan fiction. 
The third step in the fair dealing analysis requires a court to determine 
whether the copyright-protected work in question has been dealt with fair-
ly. The term fair is not defined in the Copyright Act. Whether something is 
fair “is a question of fact and depends on the facts of each case.”48 The SCC, 
in CCH (the leading Canadian decision on fair dealing), set out a list of 
factors which should be considered in determining whether a dealing has 
been fair. These factors include: the purpose of the dealing, the character 
of the dealing, the amount of the dealing, alternatives to the dealing, the 
nature of the work, and the effect of the dealing on the work.49 
The first factor, the purpose of the dealing, will tend to fairness if acts 
relating to the transformative use of copyright-protected expression are 
done for one of the fair dealing purposes. Acts which are not done for one 
of the fair dealing purposes will not pass the first step in the fair dealing 
analysis. As noted above, although a large number of acts relating to the 
transformative use of copyright-protected expression will likely be seen 
as having been done for one of the fair dealing purposes, many will not. 
The second factor, the character of the dealing, looks at how the works 
which were allegedly infringed were dealt with. The SCC notes that while 
46 Copyright Act, above note 12 at ss. 35, 38.1.
47 As discussed above, the first step of the fair dealing analysis involves determining 
whether an act was done for one of the fair dealing purposes.
48 CCH above note 36 at para. 52.
49 Ibid. at para. 53. 
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a “single copy of a work . . . used for a specific legitimate purpose” may 
tend to fairness, “multiple copies of works . . . being widely distributed . . . 
will tend to be unfair.”50 Many transformative works are distributed wide-
ly.51 In some situations, they may be distributed far more widely than the 
original work.52 Whether this factor tends to fairness or unfairness will 
depend, in large part, on how the transformative work was distributed.
The third factor, the amount of the dealing, looks at the amount of the 
original, copyright-protected work that is included in the transformative 
work. The extent to which this factor tends to fairness in any individual 
case will depend on the quantity of work taken, the importance of the 
work whose copyright was allegedly infringed, and the purpose of the 
dealing.53 The fact that some transformative works may incorporate large 
portions of the allegedly infringed work will not preclude the application 
of the fair dealing defence. As noted by Sedgwick J. in Allen v. Toronto Star 
Newspapers Ltd., it is possible to deal fairly with an entire work.54 
The fourth factor, alternatives to the dealing, looks at whether there is 
a “non-copyrighted equivalent of the work that could have been used in-
stead of the copyrighted work.”55 In determining whether this factor tends 
to fairness, the SCC has stated that it is “useful for courts to attempt to 
determine whether the dealing was reasonably necessary to achieve the 
ultimate purpose.”56 If the purpose of the dealing is to critique one song 
by combining it with another in the form of a mashup, for instance, it is 
difficult to argue that such a criticism would be equally effective if it didn’t 
“actually reproduce the copyrighted work it was criticizing.”57 If the pur-
pose of the dealing is to critique an elected politician’s actions, however, it 
could be argued that such a criticism could be equally effective in a form 
other than through a parody of a popular song directed at that politician. 
The fifth factor, the nature of the work, looks at whether the work has 
been published or whether it was confidential. While dealing with con-
fidential works may tend to unfairness, in some circumstances, increas-
50 CCH above note 36 at para. 55. 
51 Over a million tracks have been downloaded from DJ Danger Mouse’s Grey Album, a 
mashup of the Beatles’ White Album and Jay-Z’s Black Album. Matthew Rimmer, “The 
Grey Album: Copyright Law and Digital Sampling” (2005) 114 Media International 
Australia incorporating Culture and Policy 40 at 40.
52 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
53 CCH above note 36 at para. 56. 
54 Allen v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. (1995), 36 O.R. (3d) 201 (Allen). 
55 CCH above note 36 at para. 57. 
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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ing circulation of an unpublished work could tend to fairness as it “could 
lead to wider public dissemination of the work — one of the goals of copy-
right law.”58 It is likely, however, that many of the works which are remade 
through transformative use are works which have been published. If this 
is the case, this factor may not play a large role in the fairness analysis. 
The sixth factor examines the effect of the dealing on the work. The 
main question analyzed with respect to this factor is whether the “repro-
duced work is likely to compete with the market of the original work.”59 If 
it is, the dealing may tend to unfairness. It is likely, however, that very few 
transformative works will compete, at all, with the market for the original 
work. Individuals looking to buy one of the games in the Halo series to 
play will not, instead, purchase DVDs of machinima set in the Halo world. 
Someone who wants to read the original Harry Potter books will not be 
satisfied with one of the myriad Harry Potter fan fiction creations. 
Based on the above analysis and, in particular, the factor which looks at 
the effect of the dealing on the work, this chapter suggests that it is likely 
that most, if not all, of the acts relating to the transformative use of copy-
right-protected expression which have been done for fair dealing purposes 
would be considered fair. However, as discussed above, many acts relating 
to transformative works will likely not be seen as having been created for 
fair dealing purposes. Particularly, many acts with respect to transforma-
tive works which are made public and are not critical, such as acts with 
respect to works which use existing culture as the raw material for new 
expression, without critiquing or commenting on the copyright-protected 
expression itself, will likely be seen as infringing copyright. Many of these 
acts further the values underlying the constitutionally protected right to 
freedom of expression. However, as they cannot be considered to have 
been created for any fair dealing purpose, they will be excluded from the 
ambit of fair dealing. 
D. TOwARDS A RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN TRANSFORMATIVE 
USE OF COPYRIGHT-PROTECTED EXPRESSION 
1) Bill C-32 
Bill C-32, introduced by the Government of Canada on 2 June 2010, pro-
vides additional protection for acts relating to the creation, distribution, 
58 Ibid. at para. 58.
59 Ibid. at para. 59.
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and enjoyment of transformative works.60 It does so in two main ways: 
through the expansion of the fair dealing defence and through the addi-
tion of a right to create non-commercial user-generated content (provided 
that certain conditions are satisfied). 
First, Bill C-32 proposes to expand fair dealing through the addition of 
three new fair dealing categories: parody, satire and education.61 Should 
Bill C-32 be passed, individuals would have the right to use a substantial 
amount of copyright-protected expression without the authorization of 
the copyright-owner for the purposes of parody, satire, and education 
(in addition to the existing fair dealing categories of research, private 
study, criticism, review, and news reporting), provided they do so fairly. 
This amendment would render non-infringing many acts relating to the 
transformative use of copyright-protected expression which are, under 
the current Copyright Act, likely to be deemed infringing. It would do so 
by making it easier for acts which would otherwise be seen as fair to pass 
the first step of the fair dealing analysis — namely, the step in which it 
is determined whether the act was done for one of the listed fair dealing 
purposes. The extent to which this proposed expansion to fair dealing in-
creases protection for acts relating to the transformative use of copyright-
protected expression depends in large part on how broadly the categories 
of parody, satire, and education are interpreted.
Parody is an ancient concept which has been defined in many different 
ways through its long history.62 The “popular conception of parody and the 
standard dictionary definition” conceives of parody as a “specific work of 
humorous or mocking intent, which imitates the work of an individual 
author or artist, genre or style, so as to make it appear ridiculous.”63 Other 
conceptions of parody, however, permit the parodist to use the work being 
60 Bill C-32, above note 14.
61 Ibid. at cl. 21. 
62 Margaret A. Rose, Parody: Ancient, Modern, and Post-Modern (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), at 5. See also Graham Reynolds, “Necessarily Critical? The 
Adoption of a Parody Defence to Copyright Infringement in Canada” (2010) Man. 
L.J. (forthcoming); Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammed, “Parody as fair dealing in Can-
ada: a guide for lawyers and judges” (2009) 4 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice 468; Giuseppina D’Agostino, “Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copy-
right Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use” (2008) 
53 McGill L.J. 309; James Zegers, “Parody and Fair Use in Canada After Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose” (1994) 11 C.I.P.R. 205.
63 Ellen Gredley & Spyros Maniatis, “Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of 
Parody and its Treatment in Copyright” (1997) 19 Eur. I.P. Rev. 339 at 341. 
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parodied in order to critique something other than the work itself.64 These 
types of parody have been referred to as “weapon” parodies,65 and can also 
be seen as satire.66 Finally, some conceptions of parody do not insist upon 
criticism at all. Canadian literary theorist Linda Hutcheon, for instance, 
defines parody as a “form of imitation . . . characterized by ironic inver-
sion, not always at the expense of the parodied text.”67 This definition of 
parody encompasses works which are characterized by “admiration and 
reverence,”68 and, if adopted by Canadian courts, would likely encompass 
acts relating to the transformative use of copyright-protected expression 
which can be characterized as homages, tributes, or shows of appreciation 
for the parodied text. Transformative works which use existing expres-
sion solely as the raw material for future expression, however, without 
commenting upon or critiquing either the existing expression itself or 
something other than the existing expression, would likely fail to be en-
compassed by both the satire and parody categories of fair dealing, even if 
a broad conception of both categories is adopted by Canadian courts.69 
64 See Linda Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth-Century Art Forms 
(London: Methuen, Inc., 1985) at 6; Michael Spence, “Intellectual Property and the 
Problem of Parody” (1998) 114 Law Q. Rev. 594 at 594.
65 Spence, above note 64 at 594.
66 The Supreme Court of the United States, in Campbell, above note 2, noted the follow-
ing two definitions of satire: “a work ‘in which prevalent follies or vices are assailed 
with ridicule,’ 14 Oxford English Dictionary, [247 (2d ed. 1989)] at 500, or are ‘attacked 
through irony, derision, or wit,’ American Heritage Dictionary, [1317 (3d ed. 1992)] at 
1604.”
67 Hutcheon, above note 64 at 6. 
68 Gredley & Maniatis, above note 63 at 340.
69 The Supreme Court of the United States, in Campbell, above note 2, stated that  
“[p]arody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use 
the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can 
stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing” 
(580–81). Various commentators have noted that in the United States of America, 
satire generally receives less fair use protection than parody. Adriana Collado, for 
instance, notes that “[c]ourts have reasoned that, because copyright owners are not 
inclined to grant parodists permission to use their copyrighted work in a man-
ner that holds the work up to ridicule or criticism, fair use is necessary to advance 
the goals of copyright law and to prevent censorship. Courts, however, deem that 
copyright owners are likelier to allow use of their works in satire because satires do 
not target the copyrighted works directly. Thus, courts have reasoned satires do not 
need fair use protection in the same way as parodies.” Adriana Collado, “Unfair Use: 
The Lack of Fair use Protection for Satire Under § 107 of the Copyright Act” 9 J.Tech. 
L. & Pol’y 65 at 67–68, http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/vol9/issue1/collado.html. 
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The proposed addition of the education category of fair dealing could 
also impact the extent to which acts relating to the transformative use of 
copyright-protected expression infringe copyright in Canada. Although 
one way to interpret “education” is to restrict the term to activities tak-
ing place in a formal educational institution, the SCC’s statement, in CCH 
that fair dealing categories “must be given a large and liberal interpreta-
tion,” would likely require the term to be interpreted more broadly.70 For 
instance, under a large and liberal interpretation, acts could be seen as be-
ing encompassed by the fair dealing category of education if they are done 
for the purpose of educating oneself or others, whether in an institutional 
educational setting or in a less formal environment. 
Though the existing fair dealing categories already encompass many acts 
relating to education, it is likely that the creation of this new fair dealing 
category will result in various additional acts passing the first step of the 
fair dealing analysis, such as non-critical acts performed for others which 
cannot be considered to be part of any research process but which serve a 
broad, educative function. Acts relating to the transformative use of copy-
right-protected expression which are done for the purpose of education, 
such as the act of creating and disseminating a transformative work in or-
der to bring its content to the attention of a broad audience for their edifica-
tion or instruction may, for instance, be encompassed by this category. 
Bill C-32, by expanding the list of allowable fair dealing categories, will 
lead to more acts relating to the transformative use of copyright-protected 
content passing the first step of the fair dealing analysis. It is important 
to emphasize, however, that fair dealing is a process with multiple steps. 
The fact that a work may have been done for a fair dealing purpose does 
not mean that the fair dealing defence will automatically apply, resulting 
in the act being deemed non-infringing. In order for fair dealing to apply, 
the copyright-protected work must also have been dealt with fairly. As 
noted by Trudel J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal, in a decision which 
dealt with the question of whether “the photocopying of excerpts from 
textbooks for use in classroom instruction for students in kindergarten to 
grade 12”71 was fair dealing: 
I am also aware that Bill C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3rd 
Session, 40th Parliament, 59 Elizabeth II, 2010, section 21 would amend 
section 29 to state that “Fair dealing for the purpose of research, private 
70 CCH above note 36.
71 2010 FCA 198, para 2.
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study, education, parody or satire does not infringe copyright (changes 
underlined). However, this amendment serves only to create addition-
al allowable purposes; it does not affect the fairness analysis.72
The second way in which Bill C-32 provides additional protection for acts 
relating to the transformative use of copyright-protected expression is 
through the creation of a defence relating to non-commercial user-generat-
ed content, dubbed by some as the “YouTube defence.” This provision reads:
29.21 (1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to 
use an existing work or other subject-matter or copy of one, which 
has been published or otherwise made available to the public, in the 
creation of a new work or other subject-matter in which copyright 
subsists and for the individual — or, with the individual’s authoriza-
tion, a member of their household — to use the new work or other 
subject-matter or to authorize an intermediary to disseminate it, if
(a) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or 
other subject-matter is done solely for non-commercial purposes;
(b) the source — and, if given in the source, the name of the author, 
performer, maker or broadcaster — of the existing work or other 
subject-matter or copy of it are mentioned, if it is reasonable in 
the circumstances to do so;
(c) the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
existing work or other subject-matter or copy of it, as the case 
may be, was not infringing copyright; and
(d) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or 
other subject-matter does not have a substantial adverse effect, fi-
nancial or otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation 
of the existing work or other subject-matter — or copy of it — or on 
an existing or potential market for it, including that the new work 
or other subject-matter is not a substitute for the existing one.
(2) The following definitions apply in subsection (1).
“intermediary” means a person or entity who regularly provides 
space or means for works or other subject-matter to be enjoyed by 
the public
“use” means to do anything that by this Act the owner of the copy-
right has the sole right to do, other than the right to authorize any-
thing.73
72 Ibid., para. 21.
73 Bill C-32, above note 14 at cl. 22.
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This defence would protect many acts relating to the transformative use 
of copyright-protected expression from being deemed infringing. For 
instance, it likely would render lawful most non-commercial mashups, 
sampling, machinima, digital collage, fan fiction, and remix, among other 
types of non-commercial transformative works. All of these types of ex-
pression “use an existing work . . . in the creation of a new work.”74 Certain 
acts relating to the transformative use of copyright-protected expression, 
however, would not be able to benefit from this defence. For instance, 
acts done for commercial purposes are excluded from the ambit of this 
defence. As a result, creators of transformative works who wish to benefit 
financially from their creations would not be protected by the proposed 
section 29.21 defence.75
Furthermore, the non-commercial user-generated content defence only 
applies in situations where “the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, 
the new work or other subject matter does not have a substantial adverse 
effect, financial or otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation 
of the existing work or other subject-matter — or copy of it — or on an 
existing or potential market for it, including that the new work or other 
subject-matter is not a substitute for the existing one.”76 The terms “sub-
stantial,” “adverse,”, “effect,” and “potential exploitation” are not defined 
in Bill C-32. It is therefore possible, notwithstanding the statement of the 
SCC that defences to copyright infringement are users’ rights that should 
not be unduly restricted, that these terms could be interpreted in such a 
way that significantly narrows the ambit of the defence.77 Even given these 
restrictions, however, these two provisions significantly expand the abil-
ity of individuals to engage in transformative use of copyright-protected 
expression without infringing copyright. 
Both new and existing users’ rights, however, are threatened by those 
provisions of Bill C-32 that grant legal protection to TPMs. TPMs, some-
times referred to as “digital locks,” are technological measures that allow 
74 Ibid. It would also protect acts which are not transformative but which use an 
existing work in the creation of a new work.
75 Creators of transformative works who wish to benefit financially from their cre-
ations would have to rely on the application of the fair dealing defence in order to 
avoid being found to have infringed copyright. The fact that an individual profits 
from their exercise of fair dealing is not a bar to the defence. See CCH above note 35, 
where the acts of lawyers conducting the business of law for profit were found to be 
encompassed by fair dealing.
76 Bill C-32, above note 14 at cl. 22.
77 CCH above note 36 at para. 54.
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copyright owners to restrict access to and/or use of copyright-protected 
expression. Bill C-32 makes it an offence to circumvent a TPM which con-
trols access to a work, a performer’s performance fixed in a sound record-
ing, or a sound recording for all purposes save those expressly exempted. It 
also makes it an offence to offer or provide services or devices to the public 
that are “primarily for the purposes of circumventing a technological pro-
tection measure” (provided that certain other criteria are satisfied).78 
Certain narrowly-circumscribed exemptions to these offences are built 
into Bill C-32. It is not an offence, for instance, to circumvent a TPM for 
the purposes of: an investigation related to the enforcement of an Act of 
Parliament or an Act of a legislature; activities related to the protection 
of national security; ensuring computer interoperability; encryption re-
search; verifying and preventing the collection or communication of per-
sonal information; assessing or correcting computer security; making 
works, performances, and sound recordings perceptible to a person with 
a perceptual disability; making an ephemeral reproduction of a work for a 
broadcasting undertaking; or gaining access to a telecommunications ser-
vice by means of a radio apparatus (provided, in every case, that certain 
other criteria are satisfied).79 
In many instances, however, an individual could commit an offence by 
circumventing a TPM in order to do something that the individual has the 
right to do under the Copyright Act. For instance, there is no exemption 
that permits an individual to circumvent an access control TPM in order to 
exercise their right to fair dealing. As a result, individuals who circumvent 
an access control TPM for the purpose of research, private study, criticism, 
review, and news reporting will be committing an offence.
Bill C-32 also makes it an offence to offer or provide services or de-
vices to the public that are “primarily for the purposes of circumventing 
a technological measure” when the service or device is offered knowingly 
and for commercial purposes.80 Committing this offence results in expos-
ure to significant penalties which may chill the creation and distribution 
of tools used to circumvent TPMs.81 Although one consequence flowing 
from the enactment of these provisions may be a reduction of instances 
of copyright infringement, these provisions may also prevent individuals 
from exercising their user rights. A paucity of tools to circumvent TPMs 
78 Bill C-32, above note 14 at cl. 47. 
79 Ibid. at cl. 47.
80 Ibid. at cl. 47.
81 Ibid. at cl. 48.
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may render individuals unable to circumvent TPMs, even where the act of 
circumvention itself is not an offence. Thus, although Bill C-32 contains 
two provisions which provide additional protection for acts relating to 
the transformative use of copyright-protected expression, this additional 
protection is undermined by the manner in which Bill C-32 grants legal 
protection to TPMs. As a result, Bill C-32 may have the effect of limiting 
the creation and distribution of transformative works to a greater degree 
than is the case under the current Copyright Act.
2) Reforming Bill C-32
In the attempt to achieve broader protection for acts relating to the trans-
formative use of copyright-protected expression, this chapter offers two rec-
ommendations for reform of Bill C-32. First, the fair dealing defence should 
be expanded to incorporate a right to engage in the transformative use of 
copyright-protected expression. Second, the provisions relating to the legal 
protection of TPMs should be modified to ensure that it is not an offence to 
circumvent a TPM for a lawful purpose (such as to engage in fair dealing).
a) Adopting a Right to Engage in Transformative Use of 
Copyright-Protected Expression
The adoption of a right to engage in the transformative use of copyright-
protected expression will open up space within which individuals can, in 
a lawful manner, create and disseminate transformative works. Its impact 
would extend across the spectrum of transformative works, and would 
benefit both amateur transformative creators and professional trans-
formative creators. 
One objection to the creation of such a right could be that it has the po-
tential to be overbroad. As a result, in order to balance this new user right 
with the rights of copyright owners, this chapter suggests that it should be 
incorporated within fair dealing as another acceptable fair dealing category. 
Thus, the mere fact that the use is transformative would not be sufficient to 
have it declared non-infringing. The use would also have to be “fair.” If this 
proposal is accepted, individuals in Canada would have the right, under 
fair dealing, to use a substantial amount of copyright-protected expression 
without the permission of the copyright owner for the purpose of engaging 
in the transformative use of copyright-protected expression, provided they 
do so in a fair manner. As is the case with the current list of fair dealing 
categories, fairness would be determined through an analysis of various 
factors, including: the purpose of the dealing, the character of the dealing, 
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the amount of the dealing, the alternatives to the dealing, the nature of the 
work, and the effect of the dealing on the work.82
A second objection to the creation of such a right could be that it is un-
necessary to add an additional category to fair dealing in order to protect 
acts relating to the transformative use of copyright-protected expression, 
as most, if not all acts relating to transformative works could be encom-
passed by the existing (and proposed) fair dealing categories of research, 
private study, parody, satire, education, criticism, review, and news re-
porting. The above analysis has demonstrated that many transformative 
uses will likely be encompassed by the existing and proposed fair dealing 
categories. It is possible, however, that courts could interpret the scope of 
new and existing fair dealing categories in a manner which would result 
in certain transformative uses of copyright-protected not being encom-
passed by any of the fair dealing categories. These uses would then in-
fringe copyright, regardless of whether they are “fair” and regardless of 
the social benefits which arise from their creation and dissemination. The 
creation of a separate fair dealing category for transformative use would 
ensure that all fair transformative uses of copyright-protected expression 
do not infringe copyright. It would also demonstrate a recognition, on the 
part of the government, of the benefits which flow to both individuals and 
Canadian society from engaging in acts relating to the transformative use 
of copyright-protected expression. 
Canada would not be the first country to provide protection for acts 
relating to the transformative use of copyright-protected expression. The 
question of whether a new work is transformative is a key consideration 
in the United States of America’s fair use analysis.83 As well, in 2006, the 
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property, commissioned by then-Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown and “charged with examining all the 
elements of the IP [intellectual property] system, to ensure that it delivers 
incentives while minimising inefficiency,”84 recommended that the gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom take steps to create a copyright exemp-
tion for transformative use.85
82 In creating this new fair dealing category, care would have to be taken in the draft-
ing process to ensure that courts do not make “transformative use” a mandatory 
element of every claim of fair dealing. 
83 Campbell, above note 2. Fair use is the analogous American provision to Canada’s 
fair dealing defence. 
84 Gowers, above note 2 at 1.
85 Ibid. at 3. It could be argued that the creation of such a right is not necessary, as 
individuals who wish to engage in the transformative use of copyright-protected 
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b) Clarifying that It Is Not an Offence to Circumvent a TPM for 
Lawful Purposes
Achieving broader protection for acts relating to transformative works 
will also require the modification of the Bill C-32 provisions which grant 
legal protection to TPMs. As noted above, Bill C-32 makes it an offence to 
circumvent an access control TPM for any purpose save those expressly 
exempted. Although various exemptions are set out in the Bill, there is 
no exemption for fair dealing or other user rights. As a result, a user who 
circumvents an access control TPM in order to exercise their right to fair 
dealing will have committed an offence, resulting in the copyright owner 
being able to pursue various remedies.86 
In order to ensure that legal protection for TPMs will not prevent users 
from exercising their rights under the Copyright Act, this chapter suggests 
that the provisions relating to the legal protection of TPMs should be 
modified to clarify that it is not an offence to circumvent a TPM for law-
ful purposes. This approach was adopted in Bill C-60, the Liberal Govern-
ment’s failed 2005 attempt to reform the Copyright Act. Clause 27 of Bill 
C-60 states that: 
[a]n owner of copyright in a work . . . [is] . . . entitled to all remedies. . . 
that are or may be conferred by law for the infringement of a right 
against a person who, without the consent of the copyright owner 
. . . circumvents, removes or in any way renders ineffective a techno-
expression can simply secure a licence from the copyright owner allowing them to 
use the copyright-protected expression in the creation of a transformative work. For 
various reasons, however, licensing is not a suitable alternative. First, the process of 
determining who owns the copyright in a certain work may be both time consum-
ing and difficult. Second, the process of negotiating a licensing fee can be similarly 
time consuming and expensive. Third, the licensing fee itself may be unaffordable 
for certain users. Fourth, some copyright owners may only be willing to licence 
certain uses of their copyright-protected content. If an individual proposes to use 
the copyright-protected expression in a manner that conflicts with the copyright 
owner’s list of acceptable uses, the licence may be refused. Fifth, some copyright 
owners may refuse all requests for licences. Although some of these hurdles can 
potentially be overcome by the creator or of a transformative work intended for 
commercial distribution, they are likely to be more difficult for amateur creators 
to overcome, and may have the effect of chilling the creation and distribution of 
amateur transformative works. 
86 These remedies include an injunction, damages, accounts, and delivery up. Clause 47 
of Bill C-32 (specifically, 41.1(3)) indicates that copyright owners “may not elect . . . 
to recover statutory damages from an individual who [circumvented a TPM] only for 
his or her private purposes.” 
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logical measure protecting any material form of the work . . . for the 
purpose of an act that is an infringement of the copyright in it. 87
Michael Geist and Keith Rose have outlined a variety of ways in which 
Bill C-32 could be revised to adopt such an approach. One possible revision 
suggested by Geist and Rose is to “link the prohibition of circumvention 
to infringement.”88 To give effect to this proposed revision, they suggest 
revising the definition of “circumvent” set out in section 41 of Bill C-32 to 
read: 
“circumvent” means, 
(a) in respect of a technological protection measure within the 
meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition “technological pro-
tection measure”, to descramble a scrambled work or decrypt 
an encrypted work or to otherwise avoid, bypass, remove, de-
activate or impair the technological protection measure, for any 
infringing purpose, unless it is done with the authority of the 
copyright owner; and 
(b) in respect of a technological protection measure within the 
meaning of paragraph (b) of the definition “technological protec-
tion measure,” to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate or impair the 
technological protection measure for any infringing purpose.89
A second possible revision to Bill C-32 which would permit circumvention 
for lawful purposes is the addition of an explicit exemption for circumven-
tion for lawful purposes.90 To do so, Geist and Rose suggest adding subsec-
tion 41.1(5) and (6) to Bill C-32 as follows: 
Lawful purpose
(5) Paragraph (1)(a) does not apply if a technological protection 
measure is circumvented for any lawful purpose.
(6) Paragraphs (1)(b) and (c) do not apply to a person who supplies 
a service to a person referred to in paragraph (5) or who manufac-
tures, imports or provides a technology, device or component, for the 
purposes of enabling anyone to circumvent a technological protec-
tion measure in accordance with this Act.91
87 Bill C-60, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2004–2005 at cl. 27.
88 Michael Geist and Keith Rose, “Fixing Bill C-32: Proposed Amendments to the 
Digital Lock Provisions” (2010), :www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5117/125/.
89 Geist and Rose, above note 88.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
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These proposed approaches to the legal protection of TPMs are consist-
ent with the two 1996 WIPO internet treaties that Canada has signed but 
not yet ratified: the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). Article 11 of the WCT addresses TP-
Ms.92 It requires Contracting Parties to provide:
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by 
authors in connection with the exercise of their rights. . .and that re-
strict acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the 
authors concerned or permitted by law.93 
It does not, however, require Contracting Parties to provide legal protec-
tion and legal remedies against the circumvention of TPMs that are used 
to restrict acts which are permitted by law, such as acts protected by fair 
dealing. In making it an offence to circumvent an access control TPM for 
any purpose save those expressly exempted, a list which does not include 
fair dealing or other user rights, Bill C-32 provides protection beyond what 
is required by the WCT and the WPPT. It does so at the expense of users’ 
rights, and at the expense of the balance between copyright owners and 
the public interest mandated by the SCC.94 
E. CONCLUSION
Acts relating to the transformative use of copyright-protected expression 
benefit Canadian society. Through the creation, distribution, and enjoy-
ment of transformative works, individuals can question their own pol-
itical views. They can express their disapproval or support of artists and 
their works. They can interact with texts, engaging with the works and 
cultural symbols that pervade the lives of Canadians. They can become 
more active members of a robust Canadian democracy, both through pol-
itical participation and participation in the cultural life of the nation. As 
this chapter has set out, however, many acts relating to the transforma-
tive use of copyright-protected expression prima facie infringe copyright 
and cannot be saved by the fair dealing defence as it is currently written 
and interpreted. As a result, this chapter has argued that the Copyright Act 
92 The analogous provision in the WPPT, above note 15, is contained in Article 18.
93 WCT, above note 15 at Article 11.
94 See CCH above note 36 at para. 48; Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 2002 SCC 34 at paras. 30–31; Society of Composers, Authors and 
Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Ass. Of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45.
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should be reformed to grant protection to acts relating to the fair trans-
formative use of copyright-protected expression. 
Bill C-32 is the most recent attempt to reform the Copyright Act. Al-
though it contains two provisions which expand protection for acts re-
lating to the transformative use of copyright-protected expression, this 
additional protection is undermined by Bill C-32’s approach to the legal 
protection of TPMs. Under Bill C-32, it would be an offence to circumvent 
an access control TPM in order to engage in the transformative use of 
existing expression, even if the act of engaging in transformative use it-
self is otherwise lawful.
In order to ensure that the social benefits which flow from the creation, 
distribution, and enjoyment of transformative works are not lost due to 
restrictive copyright legislation, this chapter has proposed two reforms 
to Bill C-32: the expansion of the fair dealing defence to include a right to 
engage in transformative use of copyright-protected expression, and the 
modification of the provisions granting legal protection to TPMs to clarify 
that it is not an offence to circumvent a TPM for lawful purposes.
These proposals, which are consistent with the two WIPO treaties (the 
WCT and WPPT) which Canada has signed but not yet ratified, benefit both 
copyright owners and users. The ability of copyright owners to take action 
against copyright infringement is strengthened. If an individual circum-
vents an access control TPM in order to infringe copyright, they can be 
sued for both the infringing act and the act of circumvention. In this way, 
the decision of copyright owners to apply a TPM to prevent unauthorized 
access to copyright-protected material will receive some protection at law. 
This protection, however, should not permit copyright owners to sue indi-
viduals for circumventing TPMs in order to exercise their user rights. The 
amendments suggested in the final part of this chapter would clarify that 
it is not an offence to circumvent a TPM for a lawful purpose. 
If these two proposals were incorporated into the Copyright Act, indi-
viduals would have the right to engage in the fair transformative use of 
copyright-protected expression, regardless of whether this expression is 
locked behind a TPM; and regardless of whether this use fits within the 
existing (and proposed) fair dealing categories of research, private study, 
criticism, review, news reporting, parody, satire, or education. Copyright 
owners would not be able to prevent the reworking of existing expres-
sion through the application of a technological measure. Private ordering 
through technological means would not trump user rights.95 And Can-
95 Another issue which merits attention is the extent to which private ordering, through 
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adians from sea to sea to sea would be able to continue to use networked 
digital technologies to mashup, remix, remake, appropriate, and incorpor-
ate existing expression into new expression in a transformative manner, 
helping build both a stronger Canadian democracy and a more vibrant 
Canadian culture. 
contracts, should be permitted to trump user rights. TPMs are frequently used in 
conjunction with contractual arrangements. This topic, however, is beyond the scope 
of this paper to address.
